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1. Introduction 
Oil price volatility and its significant effect on the oil market has been an essential subject of academic 
interest. Many macroeconomic factors trigger oil price volatility, such as oil supply- oil demand, market 
speculation, geopolitical events, natural disasters (Kaufman et al.,2008; Florini and Sovacool, 2009; 
Martina et al., 2011).  One of the frequently cited macroeconomic factors is the influence of OPEC 
(Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) as a unified group, widely viewed as the market power 
and Non-OPEC oil producers as the fringe competitors in the oil market (Rolf Golombek et al.,2018; 
Fattouh,2012; Bremond et al., 2012).   
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OPEC member countries generate about 40 percent of the world’s crude oil, and their oil exports roughly 
represent 60 percent of the total oil exported in the world (Energy Information Administration, 2019).  
The extent of OPEC’s available production and spare capacity generally used as an indicator of influence 
on crude oil prices (Energy Information Administration, 2019).  Given OPEC’s market significance and 
geopolitical events deemed to cause potential loss of crude oil production can produce a sharp increase in 
oil prices (Energy Information Administration,2019).  Meanwhile, non-OPEC oil producers only respond 
to market prices rather than attempting to influence prices by managing production.  As a result of their 
independent decision, they are unable to control the market as they need to produce at full capacity. 
(Energy Information Administration, 2019).  From the mid-2014 to early-2015, the price of Brent crude 
oil per barrel significantly dropped to $46.  This downfall attributed to the USA’s increased shale 
production and OPEC’s decision to keep its crude oil production stable.  
 
Therefore, these current issues on the influence of OPEC and Non-OPEC on the crude oil market do raise 
serious questions about oil price volatility impact on the financial performance of oil and gas firms.  Thus, 
this creates a motivation to analyze accrual earnings management in the oil and gas industry.  Unlike 
cooking of the books, earnings management conforms to accounting standards procedures (Rahman & 
Ali, 2006).  Our research seeks to analyze the moderating effect of a dominant firm (OPEC) and fringe 
competitor (Non-OPEC) on the relationship between oil price volatility and accrual earnings 
management.   
 
2. Literature Review  
2.1 Political Cost Theory 
The theory states that companies at heightened political scrutiny will engage in accounting choices that 
decreases reported earnings, as an attempt to reduce political sensitivities such as taxes or penalties (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1978).  After Watts and Zimmerman (1978), empirical studies have suggested a more 
extensive range of measures to proxy for political cost such as geopolitics, profits, rates of return, risk, 
capital intensity, industry concentration, industry membership, effective tax rates, number of employees, 
number of shareholders, labour intensity, press coverage, and even social responsibility disclosures 
(Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981; Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Deegan 
and Hallam,1991; Panchapakesan and McKinnon, 1992; Deegan and Carroll, 1993; Lemon and 
Cahan,1997; Han and Wang, 1998; Byard et al.,2007; Hsiao et al., 2016).  In short, earnings are reduced 
downwards when there are political reasons to do so: e.g., firms in a politically sensitive industry such as 
the oil and gas industry are vulnerable to environmental concerns, antitrust allegations, and public 
perceptions of “excess profitability” (Ammr Kurdi, 2010).  Significantly, the problem is complicated 
further by global geopolitical instability that causes crude oil supply disruptions, such as production cuts 
by OPEC (Ammr Kurdi, 2010).   
 
Most previous studies on the oil industry examine the effect of a positive change in oil prices.  Studies on 
the Persian Gulf crisis (Han and Wang, 1998), hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Byard, Hossain and Mitra, 
2007), and the Arab Spring (Hsiao, Hu, and Lin, 2016) signal to income decreasing earnings management 
following several oil price shocks. Byard, Hossain, and Mitra (2007) and Han and Wang (1998) attribute 
their findings to the political cost hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).  Cormier and Magnan 
(2002) analyze Canadian oil and gas firms for 12 years (1985-1996) using oil price volatility, found some 
evidence of systematic earnings management through nondiscretionary accruals.  These studies signal that 
oil companies are willing to engage in earnings management, but their research is based on a specific 
country, e.g., North America.  Thus, there is a significant gap in the works of literature as to how they 
would react to oil price volatility caused by the influence of OPEC as a dominant firm and Non-OPEC as 
the fringe competitor.   
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2.2 Dominant- Competitive Fringe Theory 
In a traditional Hotelling model of dominant-competitive fringe (1931), the crude oil market is positioned 
as a non-cooperative oligopoly market dominated by a few large suppliers with several small producers 
(David Newberry, 1981; R.Golombek et al., 2018).  In the crude oil market, non-OPEC oil production 
driven by competitive behavior, and they are inelastic to oil price changes (Dées et al. 2007).  Non-OPEC 
producers are typically reflected as the price taker, and thus produce at near full capacity with limited 
spare capacity (R.Golombek et al.2018).  An increase in non-OPEC production will cause the oil price to 
decrease, and a decrease in their output causes the global aggregate output to fall.   
 
On the other hand, OPEC plays the market balancing role and has the incentive to exercise market power 
and to reduce or increase crude oil production based on the market needs (von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik M., 
2010; McKinsey Energy Insight, 2018).  OPEC’s behavior can be explained further by target revenue 
theory coined by (Ezzati,1976; Cremer and Isfahami, 1980; Teece, 1982), suggesting that target revenue 
is determined by the organization’s ability to constraint production and maintain the production ceiling 
based on its reserves.   
 
The theory ties with a study conducted by Dées et al. (2007), reveals that OPEC’s behavior based on spare 
capacity utilization that significantly affects crude oil prices.  Additionally, OPEC’s price-setting ability 
depends on the elasticity of crude oil demand and supply, interest rates, and reserve level (Reza, 1984).   
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Data and Sampling 
Our sample is extracted from the Datastream- Public listed oil and gas companies covering the period of 
2008 to 2018 through the Thomson Reuters Database.  The sample followed two fundamental rules of 
thumb as per accordance with Sekaran (2003, p.295).  Firstly, sample sizes should be larger than 30 and 
less than 500 firms.  Secondly, a minimum sample size of 30 for each variable is necessary for sub-
sampling.  The initial sample of this study consists of 242 firm-year observations.  Companies included in 
the final sample of 131 firm-year observations followed the conditions of (1) All financial data needed for 
the analysis are available (2) Meets the Jarque-Bera and Skewness/Kurtosis (3) No multicollinearity 
problems (4) White’s test of Heteroscedasticity.  Table 1 shows the final sample consists of listed oil and 
gas companies from Canada, Croatia, France, Indonesia, Netherlands, Thailand, the US, Gabon, Kuwait, 
Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia.  These companies are divided into two separate dummy groups of OPEC and 
Non-OPEC based on reserves to production ratio of each selected countries.   
 
Table 1: Distribution of listed oil and gas companies across countries 
 
groupdummy = NONOPEC 
    
   Domicile | 
    Country |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
     Canada |         12       13.04       13.04 
    Croatia |          8        8.70       21.74 
     France |         10       10.87       32.61 
  Indonesia |          7        7.61       40.22 
Netherlands |         10       10.87       51.09 
   Thailand |          7        7.61       58.70 
         US |         38       41.30      100.00 
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------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |         92      100.00 
 
groupdummy = OPEC 
 
      Domicile | 
    Country |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Gabon |          2        5.13        5.13 
     Kuwait |          8       20.51       25.64 
    Nigeria |         11       28.21       53.85 
      Saudi |         18       46.15      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |         39      100.00 
 
 
4. Earnings management measurement 
In this study, total discretionary, current, and non-current accruals are used as the primary proxy of 
accruals earnings management following a previous earnings management study (Hsiao et al., 2016).  We 
apply Han and Wang’s and Byard’s model for the computation of accruals as it captures the actual 
attributes and the industry specificity of oil and gas firms compared to other earnings management model 
(Hsiao et al.2016; Byard et al., 2007; Han and Wang, 2005).  Specifically, discretionary, income 
decreasing, current and non-current accruals are calculated as follows: 
 
a) Discretionary accrual measurement:  TTACi,t/TAi,t =  ᵝ0   +  ᵝ1 ( ΔREVi,t/TAi,t ) + ᵝ2 ( 
PPEi,t/TAi,t )  +   ᵝ3 ( lnSizei,t ) + ᵝ4 ( ROAi,t )  + ᵝ5 (Leveragei,t ) +  ᵝ6 (Market to Book ratioi,t )   
+  Ɛit 
 
b) Income decreasing discretionary accrual measurement:  TTACi,t/TAi,t-1 =  ᵝ0   +  ᵝ1 ( ΔREVi,t -  
ΔRECi,t /TAi,t-1 ) + ᵝ2 ( PPEi,t/TAi,t-1 )  +  ᵝ3 ( CFi,t/TAi,t-1) +   ᵝ3 ( lnSizei,t ) + ᵝ4 ( ROAi,t )  
+ ᵝ5 (Leveragei,t ) +  ᵝ6 (Market to Book ratioi,t )   +  Ɛit 
 
c) Current accrual measurement:  CACi,t/TAi,t-1 =  ᵝ0   +  ᵝ1 ( REVi,t -  RECi,t /TAi,t-1 ) +  ᵝ2 ( 
CFi,t/TAi,t-1) +   ᵝ3 ( lnSizei,t ) + ᵝ4 ( ROAi,t )  + ᵝ5 (Leveragei,t ) +  ᵝ6 (Market to Book ratioi,t )   
+  Ɛit 
 
d) Non-current accrual measurement:  NCACi,t/TAi,t-1 =  ᵝ0   +  ᵝ1 ( PPEi,t/TAi,t-1) +  ᵝ2 ( 
CFi,t/TAi,t-1) +   ᵝ3 ( lnSizei,t ) + ᵝ4 ( ROAi,t )  + ᵝ5 (Leveragei,t ) +  ᵝ6 (Market to Book ratioi,t )   
+  Ɛit 
 
Thus, our current study result should be consistent with prior earnings management studies  (Hsiao et 
al.,2016; Byard et al.,2007; Kothari et al., 2005; Asbaugh et al.,2003; Cormier and Magnan,2002;  Han & 
Wang, 1998).  Hence, we use the following model to analyze whether OPEC or Non-OPEC affects the 
relationship between oil price volatility and accrual earnings management. 
 
DACCit= ᵝ1  + ᵝ2 (OPVt-1) + ᵝ3 (group dummy) + ᵝ4 (int_groupdummy_OPVT)  + ᵝ5 (NEG_CFO) + ᵝ6 
(LOSS) +  ᵝ7 (MeetBeat) + ᵝ8 (CurrentRatio) +  ᵝ9 (Price) + ᵝ10 (EBITDA margin) + ᵝ11 (FCF)  + ᵝ12 
(Sales Growth)  + ᵝ13 (Growth) + Ɛit 
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DACCiit= ᵝ1  + ᵝ2 (OPVt-1) + ᵝ3 (group dummy) + ᵝ4 (int_groupdummy_OPVT)  + ᵝ5 (NEG_CFO) + ᵝ6 
(LOSS) +  ᵝ7 (MeetBeat) + ᵝ8 (CurrentRatio) +  ᵝ9 (Price) + ᵝ10 (EBITDA margin) + ᵝ11 (FCF)  + ᵝ12 
(Sales Growth)  + ᵝ13 (Growth) + Ɛit 
 
CACCiit= ᵝ1  + ᵝ2 (OPVt-1) + ᵝ3 (group dummy) + ᵝ4 (int_groupdummy_OPVT)  + ᵝ5 (NEG_CFO) + ᵝ6 
(LOSS) +  ᵝ7 (MeetBeat) + ᵝ8 (CurrentRatio) +  ᵝ9 (Price) + ᵝ10 (EBITDA margin) + ᵝ11 (FCF)  + ᵝ12 
(Sales Growth)  + ᵝ13 (Growth) + Ɛit 
 
NCACCiit = ᵝ1  + ᵝ2 (OPVt-1) + ᵝ3 (group dummy) + ᵝ4 (int_groupdummy_OPVT)  + ᵝ5 (NEG_CFO) + ᵝ6 
(LOSS) +  ᵝ7 (MeetBeat) + ᵝ8 (CurrentRatio) +  ᵝ9 (Price) + ᵝ10 (EBITDA margin) + ᵝ11 (FCF)  + ᵝ12 
(Sales Growth)  + ᵝ13 (Growth) + Ɛit 
 
 
Where1 
 
Total Accrual (Net result – Operating Cash Flow) / Total 
Assets  
Discretionary Accrual Modified Jones Model Cross Sectional  
Current Accrual  (Income before extraordinary items + 
depreciation and amortization minus operating 
cash flow/beginning of the year total assets) 
Non- Current Accrual  Total Accrual- Current Accrual 
Price  Indicator variable that equals one if the oil 
price is above USD50 for the current year and 
zero, otherwise 
LOSS Indicator variable that equals one if the Net 
result is negative in the current year and zero, 
otherwise 
NEG_CFO  Indicator variable that equals one if operating 
cash flow is negative in the current year and 
zero, otherwise 
EBITDA margin The EBITDA margin for firm i, at the end of 
the fiscal year.  (Extracted from Datastream) 
Current Ratio Current Asset divided by Current Liability 
Meet/Beat Indicator variable that equals one if the firm’s 
income before extraordinary income at the time 
t equals or greater than the previous year and 
zero, otherwise 
Group dummy Dummy variable that indicates OPEC is 
equaled to 1 and Non-OPEC is equaled to 0 
based on ratio to production ratio yearly 
Oil price volatility Oil Price volatility is converted into annual 
data of (Dubai, WTI, and Brent).  Secondly, it 
is calculated using Ln (Current year/ Previous 
year).  Finally, it is computed using the 
standard deviation of T-1 (Previous year to 
current) 
Growth  Entity I’s total assets in the year t divided by 
the total assets in year t-1 
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Sales Growth Entity I’s sales in the year t divided by the 
sales in year t-1 
Market to Book ratio Market capitalization divided by the book 
value of Equity.  Book value of equity is 
computed using the formula (Total assets 
minus Total liabilities minus Intangible assets 
minus Preferred Stock) 
Ln Size Firm size is computed using a log value of total 
assets in year t 
 
 
5. Descriptive statistics and correlation results 
Table 2a and 2b present the descriptive statistics and T-test statistics for model variables.  Table 2a shows 
summary statistics for all the oil and gas listed companies, divided by OPEC and Non-OPEC firms.  
OPEC and Non-OPEC firms have 39 and 92 listed firms respectively.  As presented in Table 2a,  that 
Non-OPEC firms are larger in size (measured by Growth) compared to OPEC firms.  They also have a 
significant mean value for Current Ratio (1.214) as compared to OPEC firms (1.119).   
 
For the test of differences in Table 2b, all stated t-test values of each variable are two-sided.  The results 
show that firms in the OPEC have higher discretionary (t-value = -4.1370) and current accruals (t-value = 
-3.6972) compared to Non-OPEC indicates that there is a high number of small oil and gas firms within 
the sample.  Meanwhile, T-stat reveal that income decreasing (T-value= 4.2695)  and non-current 
discretionary accruals (T-value= 6.0828) is highly associated with large-size Non-OPEC firms.  The rest 
of the results are presented below.   
      
Table 2a: Descriptive Statistics 
 
i) OPEC 
 
    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
       DACCi |         39   -.0346691    .0664695  -.2202415    .167804 
       CACCi |         39    .0184406    .0264222  -.0577226   .0634416 
      NCACCi |         39   -.0601063    .0752331  -.2431977   .1445365 
       OPVT1 |         39    .3691973    .2787955   .0184871   .7616988 
     NEG_CFO |         39    .1025641    .3073547          0          1 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
        LOSS |         39    .0512821    .2234559          0          1 
    MeetBeat |         39    .4615385    .5050354          0          1 
CurrentRatio |         39     1.11917    .7126017   .2673075   4.142798 
       Price |         39    .8461538    .3655178          0          1 
EBITDAMargin |         39    .1535128    .1466889       .002       .581 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
         FCF |         39    .0074219    .0616038  -.1160168   .1598501 
 SalesGrowth |         39    .0273189    .2932285  -.8275258   .5141564 
      Growth |         39    1.050815    .1181631   .6853893    1.42528 
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ii) Non- OPEC 
 
 
    Variable |        Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
       DACCi |         92    .0125481    .0538858   -.129971    .175115 
       CACCi |         92   -.0030575    .0319569  -.1043114    .067966 
      NCACCi |         92    .0118151    .0553577  -.1426652   .1721547 
       OPVT1 |         92    .3484187    .2645081   .0184871   .7616988 
     NEG_CFO |         92           0           0          0          0 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
        LOSS |         92    .1521739    .3611576          0          1 
    MeetBeat |         92    .5326087    .5016695          0          1 
CurrentRatio |         92    1.254024    .7162283   .3853866   4.333069 
       Price |         92    .9021739    .2987072          0          1 
EBITDAMargin |         92    .2875652    .2250335      -.069       .802 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
         FCF |         92    .0144935    .0578205  -.1713978   .1716925 
 SalesGrowth |         92   -.0309035    .3034702  -.7777702   .4883773 
      Growth |         92    1.066921    .1445025   .7644978   1.571944 
 
 
Table 2b: T-Test of differences comparing OPEC and Non-OPEC 
 
 
Variables OPEC NON-OPEC Test of 
Differences 
N  Mean N   Mean T-Stat 
DACC 39  0.02184  92 -0.01315 -4.1370*** 
DACCi 39 -0.03466 92  0.01254  4.2695*** 
CACCi 39  0.01844 92 -0.003057 -3.6972*** 
NCACCi 39 -0.06010 92  0.011815  6.0828*** 
OPVT1 39  0.3692 92  0.3484 -0.4046 
NEG_CFO 39  0.1026 92  0.00 -3.2177*** 
LOSS 39  0.05128 92  0.1522  1.6163 
MEETBEAT 39  0.4615 92  0.5326  0.7399 
CURRENT 
RATIO 
39  1.1192 92  1.2540  0.9869 
PRICE 39  0.8462 92  0.9022  0.9166 
EBITDA 
MARGIN 
39  0.1535 92  0.2876  3.4208*** 
FCF 39  0.00742 92  0.0145  0.6277 
SALES 
GROWTH 
39  0.02731 92 -0.03090 -1.0140 
GROWTH 39  1.051 92  1.067   0.6140 
*** Significant at a two-tailed  < 0.01 
 
 
 
Journal of Accounting and Finance in Emerging Economies     Vol. 6, No 1, 2020 
 
290 
 
 
 
Table 3 represents the contemporaneous accrual correlations between oil price volatility and accrual 
earnings management.  As seen in Table 3, Non-OPEC exhibits a high correlation at a five and ten percent 
percent confidence for discretionary, income decreasing and non-current accrual.  Meanwhile, OPEC is not 
correlated with discretionary,  income decreasing accrual, current, and non-current accrual. 
 
Table 3: Contemporaneous accrual correlation at 5 percent confidence level 
 
Discretionary Accrual 
and OPVT1 
Income 
Decreasing 
Discretionary 
Accrual and 
OPVT1 
Current Accrual and 
OPVT1 
Non-Current Accrual and 
OPVT1 
OPEC NON-
OPEC 
OPEC NON-
OPEC 
OPEC NON-
OPEC 
OPEC NON-
OPEC 
0.0337 0.2436** -
0.0782 
-
0.2386** 
0.1623 -0.1054 -0.0995 -0.1816* 
    - 0.0193       -  0.0220     -     -      -  0.0832 
**,* Significant at a two-tailed  < 0.05,0.10 
 
Before running the primary regression, we have made sure that we ran several tests such as the Jarque-
Bera normality test, skewness, and kurtosis test of normality, White’s test of heteroscedastic and Variance 
Inflation Factor for multi-collinearity. All the results revealed that our data is free from outliers, and they 
are normally distributed, homogenous, and free from multi-collinearity.  The results are enclosed in the 
Appendix.  
 
6. Empirical Results 
We hypothesize that OPEC and Non-OPEC are able to moderate the relationship between oil price 
volatility and accrual earnings management.  We test the hypothesis using the models as discussed in 
Section 4.  We follow the similar research methods steps from Hsiao et al., (2016); Byard et al.,(2007); 
Cormier et al., (2003); Han and Wang (1998) to estimate earnings management equations.  We find that it 
is reasonable to examine the firm-level earnings management behavior based on market grouping as there 
is a significant difference in terms of geopolitical effect between OPEC and Non-OPEC in the crude oil 
market.  
 
As shown in Column (a) and (b) of Table 4, the coefficient estimate of OPEC’s moderation effect with oil 
price volatility with discretionary accrual (coefficient= -0.0658) and income decreasing discretionary 
accrual (coefficient= 0.753) is significant at one and five percent level indicates that OPEC firms predict 
higher negative discretionary accruals compared to Non-OPEC firms during crude oil price volatility.  
These findings are fair with the dominant-competitive fringe theory.  Hochman and Zilberman (2011) 
explain that OPEC is seen as the dominant price-setter with high proven crude oil reserves compared to 
Non-OPEC firms, and able to impose production quotas to its member countries and also non-member 
countries.  OPEC are able to target revenue-based through spare capacity utilization compared to Non-
OPEC, who required to produce at full capacity in order to bring production costs lower (Kaufman et al., 
2008; R.Golombek et al.2018).  Thus, this strengthens the notion that OPEC firms engage in negative and 
income decreasing accruals higher compared to Non-OPEC firms to manage oil price volatility as Non-
OPEC firms produce at full capacity to reduce production costs.  This analysis also provides substantial 
evidence that oil price volatility is highly significant with accrual earnings management behavior amongst 
oil and gas firms as a whole.  The majority of predicted control variables are relatively significant in 
explaining the strength of the accruals method used.   
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Table 4: Regression result of Accruals  
 
a) Discretionary Accrual b) Income 
Decreasin
g 
Discretion
ary 
Accrual 
c) Current 
Accrual 
d) Non-
Current 
Accrual 
Variables P-value P-value P-value P-value 
OPVT1 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.073* 0.022** 
Groupdummy-OPEC 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.202 0.000*** 
Groupdummy_OPEC*OPVT1 -0.008*** 0.048** 0.149 0.143 
Groupdummy_NONOPEC*OPVT
1 
 0.008*** -0.048** -0.149 -0.143 
NEG_CFO 0.027** 0.574 0.000*** 0.004*** 
LOSS 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
MeetBeat 0.533 0.700 0.081* 0.285 
Current Ratio 0.481 0.818 0.001*** 0.352 
Price 0.030** 0.793 0.762 0.874 
EBITDA Margin 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.000*** 
FCF 0.000***
* 
0.015** 0.130 0.008*** 
Sales Growth 0.166 0.075* 0.002*** 0.347 
Growth 0.000*** 0.181 0.169 0.783 
***.**.* Significant at a two-tailed p-value < 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper examines the use of discretionary, income decreasing discretionary, current and non-current 
accruals as a proxy of accrual earnings management to explain earnings management prevalence to 
manage oil price volatility.  This study also looks into the geopolitical effect by introducing group 
classification of OPEC and Non-OPEC as the moderator effect.  Specifically, most of the prior earnings 
management works of literature are based on the notion that earnings management is merely focused on a 
firm and industry level.  Thus, the study initially posits that firms in either OPEC or Non-OPEC have an 
inverse moderating effect on the relationship between oil price volatility and earnings management and 
vice versa.  This research, therefore, provides a basis for accepting the null hypothesis that presumed that 
OPEC or Non-OPEC is significant in strengthening or weakening the effect of oil price volatility and 
earnings management for the discretionary and income-decreasing discretionary accrual model.  
Meanwhile, the rest of the accruals model is insignificant in affecting the relationship.   
 
Additionally, it must be noted that we are only using the reserve to production ratio as a proxy for OPEC 
and Non-OPEC, a country level variable rather than a firm-level variable to explain the effect of OPEC 
and Non-OPEC.  We agree that additional indicators required to capture the true essence of the impact of 
OPEC and Non-OPEC, for instance, supply and demand for crude oil and interest rate exchange 
(Reza,1984).  Extending with the prior research conducted by Hsiao et al., (2016),  this study provides 
evidence that oil and gas firms in OPEC and Non-OPEC have an inverse relationship in explaining the 
association between oil price volatility and earnings management via current accruals.  The rest of the 
control variable results are in line with previous studies (Hsiao et al., 2016; Ammr Kurdi, 2010; Byard et 
al., 2007; Han and Wang, 1998) 
Journal of Accounting and Finance in Emerging Economies     Vol. 6, No 1, 2020 
 
292 
 
 
 
The findings of this paper contribute to the earnings management research that examines the political cost 
hypothesis by showing how OPEC and Non-OPEC group classification affects the relationship between 
oil price volatility and accrual earnings management.  These results are of interest to regulators that are 
interested in understanding how oil and gas companies manage oil price volatility through reported 
earnings.  
 
8. Limitation of research 
This research is limited by sample constraints while engaging in a comparison study. There was a limited 
number of listed firms in the OPEC region, and they are moderately small in size in terms of market 
capitalization as compared to Non-OPEC firms.  Therefore, results may significantly limit the 
generalization of the presented results per the group classification of OPEC and Non-OPEC.  Further 
research needed with an equal extensive sample to model all known and relevant variables for the 
moderation effect of OPEC and Non-OPEC. 
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Appendix 
 
i. Test of Normality: 
 
a) Jarque-Bera Normality test 
 
Jarque-Bera normality test:  3.173 Chi(2)  .2047 
Jarque-Bera test for Ho: normality: 
 
b)      Shapiro-Wilk W test for normality 
 
    Variable |        Obs       W           V         z       Prob>z 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
    residstd |        131    0.98437      1.620     1.086    0.13872 
 
 
 
c)       Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality 
                                                               
     
                                                       ------ joint ------ 
    Variable |        Obs  Pr(Skewness)  Pr(Kurtosis) adj chi2(2)   Prob>chi2 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
    residstd |        131     0.0717        0.5859        3.61         0.1645 
 
 
 
ii. Heteroskedasticity test: 
 
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity 
         against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity 
 
         chi2(113)    =    129.25 
         Prob > chi2  =    0.1408 
 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
 
--------------------------------------------------- 
              Source |       chi2     df      p 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
  Heteroskedasticity |     129.69    113    0.1348 
            Skewness |      32.38     15    0.0057 
            Kurtosis |       5.14      1    0.0233 
---------------------+----------------------------- 
               Total |     167.22    129    0.0133 
--------------------------------------------------- 
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iii. Test of Multi-Collinearity Variance Inflation Factor  
 
a) DACC 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
       OPVT1 |      2.03    0.492256 
1.groupdummy |      3.23    0.309812 
  groupdummy#| 
     c.OPVT1 | 
          1  |      3.87    0.258172 
     NEG_CFO |      1.19    0.838222 
        LOSS |      1.32    0.757647 
    MeetBeat |      1.57    0.635057 
CurrentRatio |      1.11    0.898744 
       Price |      1.43    0.697584 
EBITDAMargin |      1.42    0.705273 
         FCF |      1.64    0.611518 
 SalesGrowth |      1.59    0.630412 
      Growth |      1.52    0.658003 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.83 
 
 
 
 
b) DACCi (INCOME DECREASING) 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
       OPVT1 |      2.03    0.492256 
1.groupdummy |      3.23    0.309812 
  groupdummy#| 
     c.OPVT1 | 
          1  |      3.87    0.258172 
     NEG_CFO |      1.19    0.838222 
        LOSS |      1.32    0.757647 
    MeetBeat |      1.57    0.635057 
CurrentRatio |      1.11    0.898744 
       Price |      1.43    0.697584 
EBITDAMargin |      1.42    0.705273 
         FCF |      1.64    0.611518 
 SalesGrowth |      1.59    0.630412 
      Growth |      1.52    0.658003 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.83 
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c) CACCi (Current Accrual) 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
       OPVT1 |      2.03    0.492256 
1.groupdummy |      3.23    0.309812 
  groupdummy#| 
     c.OPVT1 | 
          1  |      3.87    0.258172 
     NEG_CFO |      1.19    0.838222 
        LOSS |      1.32    0.757647 
    MeetBeat |      1.57    0.635057 
CurrentRatio |      1.11    0.898744 
       Price |      1.43    0.697584 
EBITDAMargin |      1.42    0.705273 
         FCF |      1.64    0.611518 
 SalesGrowth |      1.59    0.630412 
      Growth |      1.52    0.658003 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.83 
 
 
 
d) Non-Current Accrual 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
       OPVT1 |      2.03    0.492256 
1.groupdummy |      3.23    0.309812 
  groupdummy#| 
     c.OPVT1 | 
          1  |      3.87    0.258172 
     NEG_CFO |      1.19    0.838222 
        LOSS |      1.32    0.757647 
    MeetBeat |      1.57    0.635057 
CurrentRatio |      1.11    0.898744 
       Price |      1.43    0.697584 
EBITDAMargin |      1.42    0.705273 
         FCF |      1.64    0.611518 
 SalesGrowth |      1.59    0.630412 
      Growth |      1.52    0.658003 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.83 
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iv. Regression result 
 
a)  OLS Regression Discretionary Accrual 
 
      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       131 
-------------+----------------------------------   F(12, 118)      =     13.41 
       Model |  .165264108        12  .013772009   Prob > F        =    0.0000 
    Residual |  .121208647       118  .001027192   R-squared       =    0.5769 
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.5339 
       Total |  .286472755       130  .002203637   Root MSE        =    .03205 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
              DACC |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
             OPVT1 |    .045287   .0149533     3.03   0.003     .0156753    .0748987 
        groupdummy | 
             OPEC  |   .0337326   .0110024     3.07   0.003     .0119449    .0555203 
groupdummy#c.OPVT1 | 
             OPEC  |  -.0658289   .0243925    -2.70   0.008    -.1141326   -.0175251 
           NEG_CFO |   .0398014   .0177767     2.24   0.027     .0045988     .075004 
              LOSS |  -.0377784   .0098247    -3.85   0.000     -.057234   -.0183229 
          MeetBeat |   .0043971   .0070296     0.63   0.533    -.0095233    .0183176 
      CurrentRatio |   .0029296   .0041464     0.71   0.481    -.0052814    .0111407 
             Price |  -.0230734    .010529    -2.19   0.030    -.0439238   -.0022231 
      EBITDAMargin |  -.0906461   .0156876    -5.78   0.000    -.1217117   -.0595804 
               FCF |  -.4731177    .061109    -7.74   0.000    -.5941301   -.3521053 
       SalesGrowth |  -.0164058   .0117805    -1.39   0.166    -.0397345    .0069229 
            Growth |  -.1000676   .0253051    -3.95   0.000    -.1501786   -.0499566 
             _cons |   .1307974    .030816     4.24   0.000     .0697733    .1918215 
                      ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
b) OLS Regression Income Decreasing Discretionary Accrual 
 
 
      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       131 
-------------+----------------------------------   F(12, 118)      =      6.99 
       Model |  .204848064        12  .017070672   Prob > F        =    0.0000 
    Residual |  .288341723       118  .002443574   R-squared       =    0.4154 
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.3559 
       Total |  .493189787       130  .003793768   Root MSE        =    .04943 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             DACCi |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
             OPVT1 |  -.0704997   .0230635    -3.06   0.003    -.1161716   -.0248277 
        groupdummy | 
             OPEC  |  -.0521169   .0169696    -3.07   0.003    -.0857214   -.0185124 
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groupdummy#c.OPVT1 | 
             OPEC  |   .0753092   .0376221     2.00   0.048     .0008072    .1498112 
           NEG_CFO |   .0154469   .0274181     0.56   0.574    -.0388484    .0697421 
              LOSS |    .045242   .0151533     2.99   0.003     .0152344    .0752496 
          MeetBeat |   .0041877   .0108421     0.39   0.700    -.0172826    .0256581 
      CurrentRatio |   .0014786   .0063953     0.23   0.818    -.0111858    .0141431 
             Price |   .0042796   .0162396     0.26   0.793    -.0278792    .0364385 
      EBITDAMargin |   .1277528    .024196     5.28   0.000     .0798383    .1756674 
               FCF |   .2338003   .0942523     2.48   0.015      .047155    .4204455 
       SalesGrowth |   .0326858   .0181699     1.80   0.075    -.0032956    .0686671 
            Growth |   .0525543   .0390297     1.35   0.181    -.0247352    .1298437 
             _cons |  -.0729058   .0475295    -1.53   0.128    -.1670272    .0212156 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
c) OLS Regression of Current Accrual 
 
      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       131 
-------------+----------------------------------   F(12, 118)      =      9.72 
       Model |  .065663331        12  .005471944   Prob > F        =    0.0000 
    Residual |  .066457061       118  .000563195   R-squared       =    0.4970 
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.4458 
       Total |  .132120392       130  .001016311   Root MSE        =    .02373 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             CACCi |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
             OPVT1 |  -.0200047   .0110724    -1.81   0.073    -.0419311    .0019216 
        groupdummy | 
             OPEC  |   .0104569   .0081468     1.28   0.202    -.0056761    .0265899 
groupdummy#c.OPVT1 | 
             OPEC  |   .0262416   .0180618     1.45   0.149    -.0095256    .0620088 
           NEG_CFO |   -.053405    .013163    -4.06   0.000    -.0794712   -.0273387 
              LOSS |  -.0253809   .0072748    -3.49   0.001     -.039787   -.0109748 
          MeetBeat |  -.0091595   .0052051    -1.76   0.081    -.0194671     .001148 
      CurrentRatio |   .0100951   .0030703     3.29   0.001     .0040151    .0161751 
             Price |   .0023661   .0077964     0.30   0.762    -.0130729     .017805 
      EBITDAMargin |  -.0357216   .0116161    -3.08   0.003    -.0587246   -.0127186 
               FCF |   .0689445    .045249     1.52   0.130    -.0206608    .1585498 
       SalesGrowth |   .0282565   .0087231     3.24   0.002     .0109825    .0455306 
            Growth |   .0259492   .0187375     1.38   0.169    -.0111562    .0630546 
             _cons |  -.0196802   .0228181    -0.86   0.390    -.0648664    .0255059 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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d)  OLS Regression of Non- Current Accrual 
 
      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       131 
-------------+----------------------------------   F(12, 118)      =      9.26 
       Model |  .308215915        12   .02568466   Prob > F        =    0.0000 
    Residual |   .32740781       118  .002774642   R-squared       =    0.4849 
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.4325 
       Total |  .635623726       130  .004889413   Root MSE        =    .05267 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
            NCACCi |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
             OPVT1 |   -.057028   .0245762    -2.32   0.022    -.1056957   -.0083604 
        groupdummy | 
             OPEC  |  -.0758829   .0180827    -4.20   0.000    -.1116916   -.0400742 
groupdummy#c.OPVT1 | 
             OPEC  |   .0591088   .0400898     1.47   0.143      -.02028    .1384975 
           NEG_CFO |   .0860821   .0292165     2.95   0.004     .0282256    .1439387 
              LOSS |   .0571229   .0161472     3.54   0.001     .0251471    .0890987 
          MeetBeat |   .0124028   .0115533     1.07   0.285    -.0104759    .0352814 
      CurrentRatio |  -.0063708   .0068148    -0.93   0.352     -.019866    .0071243 
             Price |   .0027508   .0173048     0.16   0.874    -.0315174    .0370189 
      EBITDAMargin |   .1381052    .025783     5.36   0.000     .0870479    .1891626 
               FCF |   .2731661   .1004345     2.72   0.008     .0742785    .4720537 
       SalesGrowth |   .0182807   .0193617     0.94   0.347    -.0200607    .0566221 
            Growth |     .01148   .0415897     0.28   0.783     -.070879     .093839 
             _cons |   -.033463   .0506471    -0.66   0.510    -.1337579     .066832 
                        ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
i. Pearson Correlation 
 
             |     DACC    DACCi    CACCi   NCACCi    OPVT1 groupd~y  NEG_CFO     
LOSS MeetBeat  
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        DACC |   1.0000 
       DACCi |  -0.5809*  1.0000 
       CACCi |  -0.1366  -0.0842   1.0000 
      NCACCi |  -0.5352*  0.9184* -0.3999*  1.0000 
       OPVT1 |   0.1647  -0.1824* -0.0211  -0.1487   1.0000 
  groupdummy |   0.3422* -0.3519*  0.3095* -0.4721*  0.0356   1.0000 
     NEG_CFO |   0.3123* -0.1218  -0.1245  -0.0122  -0.0038   0.2726*  1.0000 
        LOSS |  -0.1181   0.1825* -0.4205*  0.2701* -0.0740  -0.1409  -0.0662   1.0000 
    MeetBeat |  -0.1278   0.1104  -0.0071   0.1277   0.1818* -0.0650  -0.1816* -0.1485   
1.0000 
CurrentRatio |  -0.1011   0.0706   0.2833* -0.0132   0.0075  -0.0866  -0.0482  -0.1122  
-0.0440    
       Price |  -0.2518*  0.1335   0.1337   0.0809  -0.4629* -0.0804  -0.0755  -0.1587  -
0.0157    
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EBITDAMargin |  -0.3769*  0.4843* -0.2780*  0.4514* -0.0237  -0.2884* -0.1861*  
0.0573   0.1349    
         FCF |  -0.3305*  0.0354   0.2576*  0.0583   0.0536  -0.0552  -0.0998  -0.1159   
0.2393*    
 SalesGrowth |  -0.1582   0.1446   0.2629*  0.0696   0.2110*  0.0889   0.0826  -
0.2607*  0.4458*    
      Growth |  -0.1144   0.1029   0.0984  -0.0012   0.1187  -0.0540   0.0316  -0.2755*  
0.0420    
 
             |   CurrentRatio  Price  EBITDAMargin  FCF  SalesGrowth  Growth 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
CurrentRatio |    1.0000 
Price        |    0.0298       1.0000 
EBITDAMargin |    0.0262       0.0590   1.0000 
         FCF |    0.2284*      0.0297  -0.3284*    1.0000 
SalesGrowth  |    0.0276       0.1035   0.1126     0.1411   1.0000 
 Growth      |    0.0182       0.0446   0.2635*   -0.3513*  0.2720*   1.0000 
 
